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1 Introduction
Against the dramatic increase of the US unemployment rate following the
Great Recession, policy makers have triggered, among various fiscal interven-
tions, an unprecedent unemployment insurance (UI) benefits extension. The
benefit duration increased up to 99 weeks from the standard 26 weeks. This
policy has been frequently pointed out as an important factor in exacerbat-
ing unemployment because it would have reduced job search and job accep-
tance. However, most of the discussion has left aside an important aspect of
the economic environment in which the policy has been conducted: the liquid-
ity trap. In a liquidity trap, the monetary policy is no longer able to provide
the appropriate stimulus since interest rates slash the ZLB. The output decline
calls for negative real interest rate. But low inflation or even deflation makes
the real interest rate too high which deepens the recession (Krugman (1998),
Benhabib et al. (2002), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012)) and makes employ-
ers less prone to invest in job creation. As mentioned by Hall (2011) and Hall
(2013), high discounts would be likely to imply high unemployment. In this
line of research, Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2012) have shown that the ZLB com-
bined with downward nominal wage rigidity can lead to a jobless recovery.
Output growth recovered but unemployment lingered because the deflation-
ary spiral induced by the liquidity trap makes real wages too high to be com-
patible with full employment.
Some questions naturally arise: how much of the observe increase in un-
employment is due to the ZLB and to the benefits extension? Do extended ben-
efits have different effects in a liquidity trap? How well does the UI extension
push wages and inflation upwards? In a demand-driven recession character-
ized by high discounts, the impact of a fiscal intervention hinges on its ability
to create an inflationary pressure. The originality of this paper is to investigate
how the UI extension shapes the unemployment rate during the 2008 crisis
when the nominal interest rate is held at the ZLB and when the inflationary
effects of the policy are taking into account. For this purpose we use a New
Keynesian business cycle model with search and matching frictions and price
rigidities. We exploit aggregate data from unemployment insurance to quan-
tify the stimulus plan and perform counterfactual experiments to identify the
effects of unemployment benefits.
The UI extension effect has been widely criticized on behalf of the standard
disincentive effects on job search decisions. Barro (2010), for instance, argues
that it subsidized unemployment and led to insufficient job search and job ac-
ceptance. According to his own calculations the jobless rate could be as low as
and Kim Hyunchung) for their helpful advice. Finally, we thank Maud Bossard and Lusine
Nazaretyan for the rereading of the article. This research was supported by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". The usual disclaimer applies.
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6.8%, instead of 9.5% if jobless benefits hadn’t been extended to 99 weeks. Empirical
studies found however, a much more modest value. Rothstein (2011) shows
that UI extensions raised the unemployment rate in early 2011 by only about
0.1 to 0.5 percentage point, Fujita (2011) by about 0.8 to 1.8 and Farber & Val-
letta (2013) by 0.4. Interestingly, Hagedorn et al. (2013) show that the response
of the job finding rate mainly explain the persistent increase in unemployment
while the search intensity plays little. They argue that the wage pressure in-
duced by the benefits extension would have reduced the incentive for firms to
invest in job creation. In a general equilibrium framework, Nakajima (2012)
found that the 2009 UI extension has raised the unemployment rate by 1.4
percentage points. On the opposite, Krugman (2013) argues that slashing un-
employment benefits - which would have the side effect of reducing incomes
and hence consumer spending - would not create more jobs but just make the
situation worse because employment is limited by demand, not supply.
If, as mentioned Hagedorn et al. (2013), the UI extension has increased
wages, the overall impact is ambiguous due to the inflationary pressure that
may curb the increase in the real interest rate. In the literature presented above,
the study of unemployment benefits abstracts from the liquidity trap situation
and macro models assumes that the recession is driven by productivity shocks.
This is at odds with the data since negative supply shocks cause an inflation-
ary pressure and can not affect the interest rate in a way that they mimic the
financial market turmoils. We argue that the outcome of the UI extension is
strongly linked to the response of the real interest rate. The assessment of
unemployment benefits must embed the nominal sphere, a proper demand-
driven recession and must consider the macroeconomic conditions.
We show that when the economy enters in a liquidity trap the unemploy-
ment rate can dramatically increase. While an increase in unemployment ben-
efits always raises the unemployment rate in normal time, it may have oppo-
site effects in a liquidity trap, depending on the shock that sent the economy
to the ZLB. The counterfactual exercise shows that the unemployment ben-
efits extension triggered following the Great Recession would have slightly
reduced unemployment but only when the nominal interest rate has reached
the ZLB. We also use alternative specifications of unemployment benefits and
alternative calibrations of search intensity, labor market frictions and real wage
rigidities. It is shown that the UI extension, even in the worst case considered,
does not cause a sizeable increase in unemployment as long as the interest rate
is held at the ZLB.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 is devoted to the pre-
sentation of the New Keynesian DSGE model. Section 3 addresses calibration.
Simulations and counterfactual experiments are presented in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 concludes. We provide a separate appendix describing unemployment
benefits multiplier, the model, the calibration and the solution method.
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2 The model
We use a baseline New Keynesian DSGE model with search and matching fric-
tions (Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)). The model is characterized by nominal
price rigidities (Rotemberg’s style), monopolistic competition, and a feedback
Taylor rule for monetary policy. We focus on the flow of workers between em-
ployment and unemployment. Time is discrete and our economy is populated
by homogeneous workers and firms. Producing firms are large and employ
many workers as their only input into the production process. Labor may be
adjusted through the extensive margin (employment), individual hours are
fixed. Wages are the outcome of a bilateral Nash bargaining process between
each large firm and each worker. We calibrate the model on US data. Aggre-
gate shocks to the discount factor fuel up the cycle.
2.1 The labor market
The search process and recruiting activities are costly and time-consuming for
firms and workers. A job may either be filled and productive, or unfilled and
unproductive. To fill their vacant jobs, firms publish adverts and screen work-
ers, incurring hiring expenditures. Workers are identical and they may either
be employed or unemployed. The number of matches, mt, is given by the






)− 1γ ≤ min(etst, vt) (1)
where vt ≥ 0 denotes the mass of vacancies, st ≥ 0 represents the mass of
searching workers and et ≥ 0 stands for the endogenous search effort. The la-
bor force, L, is assumed to be constant over time. Assuming L = 1 allows us to
treat aggregate labor market variables in number and rate without distinction.
The matching function (1) is increasing and concave in its two arguments. A
vacancy is filled with probability qt = mt/vt and the job finding probability
per efficiency units of worker search is ft = mt/(etst).
2.2 The sequence of events
Following Hall (2005), we abstract from job destruction decisions by assum-
ing that in each period a fixed proportion of existing jobs are exogenously de-
stroyed at rate ρx. nt denotes employment in period t. It has two components:
1The use of a CES matching function, instead of the standard Cobb-Douglas one allows
to evaluate how a change in the degree of matching frictions affects our results. The CES
encompasses the Cobb-Douglas case. An increase in γ reduces the mismatches and frictions.
If γ→ +∞, mt = min(st, vt) which is a frictionless hiring process. Furthermore, it ensures the
job finding and filling probabilities remains below 1.
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new and old workers. New employment relationships are formed through the
matching process in period t. The number of job seekers is given by:
st = 1− (1− ρx)nt−1 (2)
This definition has two major consequences. First, it allows workers who lose
their job in period t to have a probability of being employed in the same period.
Second, it allows the model to make a distinction between job seekers and
unemployed workers ut = 1− nt. The latter receives unemployment benefits.
The employment law of motion is given by:
nt = (1− ρx)nt−1 + mt (3)
2.3 The representative household
There is a continuum of identical households of measure one indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
Each household may be viewed as a large family. There is a perfect risk shar-
ing, family members pool their incomes (labor incomes and unemployment
benefits) that are equally redistributed. We suppose that households have
preference over different consumption varieties. Good varieties are indexed
by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each household maximizes the aggregate consumption using








which describes the optimal level of cjt and where ct is aggregate consump-






1−ε . The second




















nt is the level of employment supplied by households. The parameters σ > 0
and 1 + φ > 0 denote the coefficient of risk aversion and the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity respectively. βt represents a discount factor shock. The repre-
sentative household chooses the set of processes ΩHt = {ct, et, dt, nt}∞t=0 taking
2We skip intermediary equations since they are standard.
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as given the set of processes {pt, wt, it, ft}∞t=0, and the initial wealth (d0) so as
to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint:
ptstk(et) + ptct + dt = dt−1(1 + it−1) + wtnt + (1− nt) bt + Πt + Tt (6)
and the law of motion of employment:
nt = (1− ρx)nt−1 + ftstet (7)
k(et) is the cost of searching a job for a job seeker. dt is the household’s holding
of one period domestic bonds at date t. The corresponding nominal interest
rate is it. wt is the nominal wage level. Πt represents profits from holding
shares in domestic goods firms. Tt is a lump-sum tax and bt denotes unem-






+Etβt+1(1− ρx) (k(et+1)λt+1 + (1− ft+1et+1)ϕt+1) (9)
λt = c−σt (10)








Equation (9) is the marginal value of employment for a worker where wRt =
wt/pt and bRt = bt/pt denotes the real wage and the real unemployment ben-
efits level respectively. λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
Equation (11) defines the standard Euler equation and (12) stands for the opti-
mal searching strategy.
2.4 Firms
There is a continuum of producers in a monopolistically competitive market
indexed by j. They use labor as their only input and sell output to the repre-
sentative household. They face quadratic price adjustment cost (Rotemberg-
style). The production function of a firm j using a fraction njt of total employ-
ment such that
∫ 1
0 njtdj = nt is given by:
yjt = nαjt (13)
α is the employment share of production in the consumption good. The opti-
mization problem of the firm j consists in choosing the set of processes ΩFjt =
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{vjt, pjt, nt}∞t=0 taking as given the set of processes {pt, wjt, qt}∞t=0. Each j pro-























njt − κvjt + ytΓπ(pjt)
]
subject to the production function (13) and the following evolution of em-
ployment:
njt = (1− ρx)njt−1 + qtvjt (15)
pjt
pt is the relative price which coincides with the marginal cost of the pro-










This cost is assumed to be proportional to the output level yt. Inflation is de-
fined as the gross inflation rate πt = pt/pt−1. ψ is the price adjustment cost
parameter and π̄ is the steady state inflation. Hiring is costly and incurs a cost
κ per vacancy posted (with
∫ 1
0 vjtdj = vt). It is paid by the firm as long as
the job remains unfilled. Since all firms choose the same price and the same
number of vacancies in equilibrium we can drop the index j by symmetry. The
optimality conditions of the above problem are:



























where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the employment evo-
lution that gives the expected marginal value of a job for the firm3. mct is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the individual consumption demand.













3It is obtained by deriving the program (14) with respect to nt.
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This condition shows that the expected gain from hiring a new worker is equal
to the average cost of search (which is the marginal cost of a vacancy times the
average duration of a vacancy 1/qt).
2.4.1 Wage setting
At equilibrium, filled jobs generate a return (the firm marginal value of the
job µt plus the worker marginal value of the job ϕt) greater than the value of
a vacant job and of an unemployed worker. Nominal wages are determined
through an individual Nash bargaining process between each worker and his
employer who share the total surplus of the match. The outcome of the bar-















= (1− ξ)µt (22)
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − ξ denote the firms and workers bargaining power
respectively. Using the definition of µt and ϕt, we have





















As it is standard in matching models, the real wage is a weighted sum of the
worker’s outside option and their contribution to the product.
2.5 The monetary and fiscal authorities
We assume that the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate it in response
to deviations of inflation and output from their steady-state value according to
a Taylor-type rule:















We assume that unemployment benefits are proportional to the aggregate wage
and obey to the following rule:
bRt = τtwt (25)
where τt is the replacement rate. It follows an AR(1) process. The fiscal author-
ity finances unemployment benefits bt through the lump-sum tax Tt. Formally
the fiscal budget rule satisfies:
dt + bt(1− nt) = (1 + it−1)dt−1 + Tt (26)
2.6 Market clearing
The aggregation of individual profits Πt is given by:
Πt = ptyt − ntwt − ptytΓπt (27)
Equation (26) together with the budget constraint (6) and the profit (27) give









= ct + κvt + stk(et) (28)
3 Model calibration
Quarterly frequencies are assumed in our calibration. The benchmark cali-
bration is standard and follows Christiano et al. (2011), Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2012), Aruoba & Schorfheide (2013). The model is solved using a Param-
eterized Expectation Algorithm (PEA) with regime switching4.
Preferences, production and shocks: We set the steady state discount factor to
0.996 and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity to 1. The risk aversion coefficient
σ is set to 1 and, following the standard approach, the elasticity of substitution
between goods ε = 6, which gives a gross markup of about 1.2. The elasticity
of output with respect to employment (α) is equal to 1 in our benchmark. βt
follows an AR(1) process: log βt = ρβ log βt−1 + (1− ρβ) log β + σβε
β
t where
ρβ = 0.85 and σβ = 0.002 in order to match the average time spent at the ZLB
of 5%.
4 The ZLB can not been accurately studied when the model is solved using linear-
approximation methods, see Braun et al. (2012) for comparison. A full description of the
algorithm is provided in the separate appendix.
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Variables Symbol Value Source
Discount factor β 0.996 Standard
Risk av. coefficient σ 1.00 Standard
Elast. of subst. between goods ε 6.00 Standard
Frisch elasticity φ 1.00 Standard
Annual steady state inflation π 1.005 Target
Production function elasticity α 1.00 Standard
Autocorr. coefficient ρβ 0.85 FGGR
Std. of βt σβ 0.002 Target 5pct at the ZLB
Vacancy posting costs κ 0.05 Target κv ' 0.01y
Search cost curvature η 2 Assumed
Disutility of search k0 0.02 Deduced
Disutility of labor ` 0.77 Deduced
Replacement rate ρR 0.15 See appendix
Matching frictions γ 2.74 Target q ≡ 0.9
Worker bargaining power ξ 0.50 PP
Price adjustment ψ 90.00 ' Calvo 0.75
Response to inflation ρπ 1.50 Standard
Response to output ρy 0.25 Standard
Interest rate smoothing ρi 0.60 Target ZLB 2009Q1
Autocorr. coefficient bt ρb 0.80 See appendix
Std. of bt σb 0.0025 See appendix
Table 1: PARAMETERS FOR THE BENCHMARK PP:Pissarides & Petrongolo
(2001), FGGR: Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012).
Labor market, stocks and flows: The US unemployment rate u is 5.5%
on average over several decades. We set the probability of being unemployed
ρx = 10.61% as in the data. At the steady state, the number of matches must be
equal to the number of separations: m = ρxn with n = 1− u = 94.5. We get the
number of job seekers from the definition s = 1− (1− ρx)n. Setting e = 1, in-
volves a job finding rate f = m/(es) = 64.6% and a hiring rate m/n = 10.61%,
close to the data (10.65%) from the BLS. Following Andolfatto (1996), the rate
at which a firm fills a vacancy is about 0.9. From the CES matching function,
γ is calculated in such a way that q = 0.9. It follows that v = m/q. According
to Pissarides & Petrongolo (2001) ξ = 0.5. The costs of posting vacancies κ is
about less than 1% of the GDP. Following Merz (1995), the cost of search takes
the form: k(e) = k0eη with k0 > 0 and η > 1. We first assume that η = 2. We
come back latter on this assumption. The remaining parameter ` and k0 are
set to balance the steady state real wage equation (23) and the optimal search
strategy equation (12).
Monetary and fiscal policy: Inflation at the steady state is about 2% on the an-
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nual basis on average. With β being equal to 0.996, the Euler equation involves
an annual steady state nominal interest rate of 3.6% and a real interest rate of
about 1.6%. Prices adjust infrequently. We assume that ψ = 90 which corre-
sponds to a Calvo parameter of 0.75 when ε = 6 in the log-linearized Phillips
Curve, as it is standard. From popular DSGE estimations, we have ρπ = 1.5,
and ρy = 0.25. ρi is set to match the path of the nominal interest rate over
1998Q4-2013Q2, especially the period of ZLB. We found that ρi = 0.6 which is
less than conventional values found in estimations but still consistent with the
rapid decline of the interest rate in 2008. Finally, we assume that the replace-
ment ratio τt follows an AR(1) process: log τt = ρτ log τt−1 + (1− ρτ) log τ +
στε
τ
t . We adopt a modified version of the OECD methodology to calculate the
steady state replacement rate. It is found to be equal to 0.15. The volatility
and the persistence of the AR(1) are determined according to the time series
we built (see appendix for details). The calibration is summarized in Table 1.
4 Quantitative evaluation of the model
4.1 How does the ZLB impact the economy?
We first present some intuitive results on the ZLB. To understand how the ZLB
impacts the labor market, we compute the response of the variables following
a sufficiently large demand shock to send the economy on the ZLB (see Figure
1). The size of the shock is calibrated to match the observed increase in unem-
ployment. It reached 10% in October 2009. In our model such a shock involves
a fall in output of 5% and a fall in the quarterly gross inflation rate of about
1.5%, broadly consistent with the data. The implied ZLB spell is equal to six
quarters. Firms cut vacancies by around 45% which is a similar decrease in the
data between 2007Q4 and 2009Q4. The real interest rate increases on impact
and gently returns to its equilibrium value.
The red dotted line shows the response of the variables if the nominal in-
terest rate is not constrained by the ZLB. It is shown that the ZLB amplifies the
propagation of the labor market downturn. Without any binding constraint,
the nominal interest rate falls to -2.5% which implies a decrease in the real
interest rate and limits the increase in unemployment. The initial fall in va-
cancies and in the hiring rate are 10% lower. The faster stabilization in real
wage dampens the decrease in the marginal cost and the deflationary pressure.
Search intensity falls less than in the constrained case. The drop in output is
found to be larger (about 1% point) on impact and the subsequent periods
when the economy is constrained by the ZLB.
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Figure 1: Impulse response function - counterfactual analysis.
4.2 Unemployment benefits multipliers
Before running the counterfactual experiments we show preliminary results
on the fiscal multiplier resulting from a one-period and temporary increase in
the replacement rate. Figure 2 shows two types of multiplier5: the marginal
multiplier and the cumulative multiplier. The first one measures the marginal
output gain from an increase in unemployment benefits and the second dis-
counts and sums up to date the whole output gain since unemployment bene-
fits have increased.
In the standard DMP model, an increase in the unemployment benefits
raises the workers’ outside option, which is the present value of being un-
employed. It strengthens workers’ bargaining position and allows them to
claim for higher wages. In addition, the decrease in workers’ search intensity
reduces firms bargaining position because it makes the outside option more
valuable. Firms become less prone to hire workers and cut the number of
vacant jobs. The labor market tightness falls and the unemployment rate in-
creases. This is the basic story in normal circumstances. In this case the mul-
5See the separate appendix for details.
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tiplier (solid black line) jumps down. One additional unit of unemployment
benefits causes a 0.2 point decline in output6 on impact and involves a negative
cumulative multiplier of about 0.3 in the long-run.
































Figure 2: Impulse response function - Unemployment benefits multiplier. Unemploy-
ment benefits increase by 1%.
At the ZLB, a rise in unemployment benefits may increase output and
lower unemployment. The intuition is as follow. Unemployment benefits in-
crease real wages. On one side it reduces the search intensity and the incentive
for firms to hire. But on the other side, it curbs the decline in the marginal
cost and the deflationary spiral which dampens the increase in the real inter-
est rate. Indeed, the liquidity trap is characterized by a zero nominal interest
rate and a deflation. The real interest rate is too high compared to the value
that clears the market. As a consequence, the size of the multiplier hinges on
1) the size of the recessionary shock that drives deflationary spiral and 2) the
ability of unemployment benefits to create a sufficient inflationary pressure to
lower the real rate. If the nominal interest rate lasts several periods at the ZLB
(deep recession), a fiscal policy generating inflation is likely to reduce unem-
ployment. If the nominal interest rate lasts only few periods at the ZLB, the
decrease in real interest rate does not offset the disincentive effect of unem-
ployment benefits extensions on search and hirings. A nominal interest rate
held seven periods at the ZLB increases output and reduces unemployment.
The marginal multiplier becomes negative when the nominal interest rate is
moving away from the ZLB as it is the case in normal circumstances. Due to
the persistence of the unemployment benefits shock the cumulative multiplier
is barely positive.
6Since α = 1, yt = nt = 1 − ut. Then, the decline in output of 0.25 is equivalent to a
proportional rise in unemployment.
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4.3 Counterfactual analysis
We now perform a counterfactual analysis based on the observed unemploy-
ment path. We evaluate what would have been the path of the economy, and
especially unemployment, in the absence of the ZLB, the unemployment ben-
efits extension and both at the same time. First, we build a time series for the
replacement ratio based on variations in the maximum benefits eligibility du-
ration (see Figure 3). The benefits extension is based on two programs: the
Extended Benefits program (EB) and the Emergency unemployment compen-
sation (EUC08)7. It is worth mentioning that the maximum duration strongly
increased but never exceeded 90 weeks when aggregated over each states.
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Figure 3: Unemployment insurance replacement rate.
We compute the shock τt that reproduces the replacement rate. Second, we
solve for the path of the discount factor shock that makes the simulated series
of the unemployment rate as closed as possible to its empirical counterpart.
The path of the discount factor shock (obtained by simulations) and the re-
placement rate shock (calculated using the data on unemployment insurance
eligibility) are depicted in Figure 4. The replacement rate increases slightly
during the 2001 recession because of the automatic adjustments triggered un-
der the Extended Benefits Program. It increases sharply in 2008 according to
the Extended Benefits Program and the Emergency Unemployment Compen-
sation. The discount factor shock is well bellow zero at the beginning of the
sample since the unemployment rate is quite low before the 2001 recession. It
almost came back to zero and falls short again as the unemployment recovers.
Finally, the huge increase in unemployment calls for a high discount factor and
gently decreases as unemployment declines.
7See appendix for details.
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Figure 4: Path of the shocks.
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Figure 5: Simulated series vs Data.
Figure 5 shows the simulated path for macroeconomic time series. Despite
the remarkable simplicity of the model, the fit of the aggregate variables is
surprisingly good. Recall that we only use one shock to reproduce the histori-
cal unemployment rate, the rest of the macroeconomic series being simulated.
The simulated nominal interest rate behaves similarly to the one observed in
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the data. It hits the ZLB just one quarter later but stays at the ZLB until now.
The model matches reasonably well the magnitude of the observed deflation.
The simulated fall in the hiring rate in 2008 is not as severe as in the data but
still acceptable.
The alternative scenarios are presented in Figure 6. Given the path of
the shocks, an economy without ZLB would have experienced lower unem-
ployment. Differently said, a negative nominal interest rate instead of the 0%
would have implied a decrease in unemployment. The biggest fall in unem-
ployment that an unconstrained Taylor rule would have permitted is in 2011.
A downward adjustment in the nominal interest rate to -1.3% would have
dampened the rise in unemployment by about 1 percentage points. While the
ZLB has a small impact on inflation, the simulations suggest that the hiring
rate could have recovered their long-run level more rapidly.
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No UB shock, No ZLB
Figure 6: Counterfactual analysis.
The second counterfactual scenario (red dotted line) consists in simulating
the model using the path of the discount factor shock but not the replacement
rate shock. In line with the intuition of previous experiments, the unemploy-
ment benefits extension is far from having exacerbate the rise in unemploy-
ment. As the path of inflation suggests, the inflationary pressure caused by
the rise in the replacement rate breaks the real interest rate increase. In turn,
this effect offset the decline in search intensity and the rise in real wages that
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make employers less prone to post vacancies. Unemployment would have
been lower in 2009Q1 since the nominal interest rate was not at the ZLB in our
simulation. Thereafter, unemployment would have been higher if the US had
not triggered the EB and the EUC08.
Last but not least, we remove both the ZLB and the variation in unemploy-
ment benefits in order to highlights the impact of unemployment benefits in
the absence of the ZLB. The implied larger deflation, would have called for
negative interest rate (-3% quarterly). If the interest rate was allowed to fall
below zero, the unemployment rate would have declined by about 2 percent-
age points (green squared line). The reason is that making τt constant would
have translated into a downward pressure on real wages without raising the
real interest rate. Consequently, the increase in employers’ surplus would have
fostered the job creation otherwise. This is nothing else than the effect of un-
employment benefits in normal circumstances. We conclude that extended
benefits reduce unemployment but only at the ZLB.
4.4 Robustness of results
We check the robustness of the major result i.e the increase in unemployment
when no benefits extensions are triggered at the ZLB. We use alternative spec-
ifications of the replacement rate shock, different calibrations for the search
intensity curvature, the cost of posting vacancies, the level of matching fric-
tions and we introduce real wage rigidities. Figure 7 shows the variation in
unemployment (w.r.t the observe rate) when the UI extension is shut down. In
most of the cases, unemployment would have declined early in the crisis. The
reason is that the rise in unemployment benefits have been triggered before
the nominal interest rate reaches the ZLB. The standard effects of unemploy-
ment benefits apply. Differently said, if the goal of policy makers was to lower
unemployment, either the central bank did not adjusted the nominal interest
rate downward rapidly enough, either the rise is unemployment benefits was
too early. We now focus on the ZLB.
We define the replacement rate as the government expenditures in unem-
ployment insurance per unemployed divided by the aggregate wage rate8.
The increase in unemployment induced by the unresponsiveness of UI ben-
efits would have been quite similar to the initial case. This result holds when
considering the cyclical component of the replacement rate as a proxy for the
shock9. As an additional exercise, we assume that bt does not depend on
wages: bt = b exp(gt), gt ∼ AR(1). We set b so as to make the steady state
unchanged. As previously, we remove the simulated shock that reproduces
the replacement rate in level and in deviation from the trend. UI benefits still
8See appendix C for details.
9We remove the trend using an HP-filter with smoothing parameter 1600.
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lower the increase in unemployment during the liquidity trap.
Figure 7: Counterfactual analysis: Robustness of results. Variation in unemployment
in pp. when the UI extension is shut down. Red shaded area: outside the ZLB for the red dotted
line. Gray shaded area: outside the ZLB for the black solid line.
We now set the search intensity curvature η equal to 1 (as in Merz (1995))
and to 3. The search intensity may have a sizeable impact on unemployment.
We observe an average 0.25 percentage point decline in unemployment if η =
3. In Merz (1995) calibration, the unemployment benefits extension would
have avoided an additional 1.5 percentage points increase in unemployment in
2009. It should be noted that if search effects have little incidence, as suggested
by Chetty (2008) and Hagedorn et al. (2013), the decrease in unemployment
induced by the policy could be bigger.
The contribution of labor market frictions can be determined by changing
κ and γ. Not surprisingly, more matching frictions (γ lower) or more hiring
costs (κ higher) are likely to increase the unemployment gain from the fiscal in-
tervention. Indeed, the mismatches between workers and jobs become higher.
The policy translates more into wages than into quantities (labor flows). It re-
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sults in a stronger wage pressure, which is worthwhile to lower real interest
rate. Even with a low degree of labor market frictions, we do not observe any
sizeable decrease in unemployment.
Finally, we introduce a real wage rigidity in the form of a wage norm as in
Shimer (2005):
w∗t = aw
R + (1− a)wRt (29)
where a stands for the degree of real wage rigidity and w∗t is the wage rate
in the economy. It is a weighted sum of the Nash bargained wage wRt and
a constant (the steady state level). Basically, more wage rigidities reduce the
inflationary pressure but also the negative impact of wage on firms’ incentive
to post vacancies. The two effects canceled out. As long as the interest rate is
stacked at ZLB, the policy has virtually no impact when the degree of wage
rigidity is high.
5 Conclusion
The novelty of the present paper is to investigate the extent to which the un-
precedent unemployment benefits extension is responsible for the strong in-
crease in unemployment during the Great Recession. The disincentive aspect
of UI has been frequently pointed out as an important source of excessive un-
employment but has never been studied in an economy characterized by high
real interest rate. We argue that the interaction between the unemployment
benefits extension and the ZLB matters. We show that the ZLB may amplify
the increase in unemployment following a demand-driven recession. Unem-
ployment benefits extensions cause high unemployment only if the economy
is out of the liquidity trap. When the nominal interest rate is held at the ZLB,
its impact on firms willingness to hire is ambiguous. It depends on whether
the inflationary pressure that reduces real interest rate offset the disincentive
effect of unemployment benefits extensions on hirings.
For a broad variety of calibrated parameters it is shown that the UI exten-
sion, even in the worst case considered, does not cause a sizeable increase in
unemployment as long as the interest rate is held at the ZLB. Using a standard
calibration, a rise in unemployment benefits reduces, not increases, unemploy-
ment. These results go in opposite directions to previous studies that abstract
from the liquidity trap effects. More generally, we highlight the importance of
the macroeconomic conditions, especially the behavior of the interest rate and
the aggregate demand, for a quantitative evaluation of unemployment bene-
fits extensions.
We are aware that the present contribution uses a very simple and probably
too stylized model. It can be extended in many directions in order to provide
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a better robustness analysis of UI extensions. It seems crucial to investigate al-
ternative wage structures, the role of labor market participation, the behavior
of layoff, the heterogeneity among workers and firms and additional sources
of frictions as in Carrillo & Poilly (2013). In addition, we have left completely
aside the normative implications. The welfare gains (losses) could imply dif-
ferent policy recommendations. For instance, Mitman & Rabinovich (2011)
show that the path of optimal unemployment benefits is pro-cyclical while
Moyen & Stahler (2012) and Landais et al. (2010) found the opposite. Rendahl
(2012) shows that a government spending policy in a severe recession charac-
terized by a ZLB involves a huge fiscal multiplier, reduces unemployment and
is unambiguously Pareto improving. However, these issues are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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A Unemployment insurance benefits extension
States unemployment insurance and the federal government have adjusted
unemployment benefits through the duration margin. In normal circumstances
and under the regular program: Unemployment Compensation (UC), an eligible
unemployed worker may receive unemployment benefits up to 26 weeks in
most states. During economic downturn, automatic benefits extensions are
triggered under the Extended Benefits (EB) program. The duration is 13 or 20
weeks depending on the state’s insured unemployment rate (IUR) or the total
unemployment rate (TUR). In addition, the Emergency Unemployment Compen-
sation (EUC08) has been launched in 2008 and has been redefined in the ARRA
context in 2009. It also increases the maximum benefits duration. Four waves
called « Tiers » have been implemented. The first one (Tiers I) is effective with-
out any conditions on states’ experience with unemployment. Tiers II, III and
IV require a condition on the IUR and/or TUR to be effective.
For these purposes, we extract the series of the IUR and TUR for each
state10 of the US and compute if the state is eligible for the EB and the EUC08
programs. The sum of these three programs gives the maximum duration of
unemployment benefits for each state. It is weighted in order to build an ag-
gregate indicator. We assume the weights are equal to the number of total
insured unemployed workers in the state divided by the total insured unem-
ployed workers in the US. The next step is to build a time series for unem-
ployment benefits. We assume that the extended UI benefits, characterized by
a strong increase in the maximum benefits duration, can be viewed as an in-
crease in the aggregate replacement rate. Indeed, an increase in the duration
involves a higher expected value from unemployment. Since the mechanisms
behind the labor market mainly rely on the expected marginal value of em-
ployment, any rise in the benefits duration acts like a decrease in the marginal
10We use data from each state except Virgin Island for which we do not have the entire time
series. We therefore have 52 states.
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value. For this reason, a shock on the replacement rate in our model seems to
be a good and tractable candidate to proxy the extended unemployment in-
surance benefits11. In order to build this shock we exploit the variations in the
maximum unemployment benefits duration12 calculated previously. The use
of unemployment benefits duration to determine a replacement rate index is
widely used by the OECD and Layard et al. (2005) for international compar-
isons. Basically, they determine the benefit replacement ratio by the following
formula:
τ =
0.6(2ndand 3rdyear RR) + 0.4(4thand 5thyear RR)
(1styear RR)
where RR stands for replacement ratio. RR is equal to the gross replacement
rate τg (50% in our case) multiplied by the number of weeks the unemployed
worker receives unemployment benefits during the j-th year (j = 1, ..., 5) of
unemployment divided by 53. This methodology determines a replacement
rate through a duration, which is useful for our purpose. In addition, it gives
less weight on durations exceeding 3 years. The RR in year 2 to year 5 are
divided by the first year RR. This takes into account the declining profile of
benefits. We adapt these two assumptions because we do not perform any
international comparisons and unemployment benefits do not decrease with
unemployment spells as long as the unemployed worker is eligible. We adapt
our calculation by focusing on the first 8 quarters because the maximum du-
ration never exceeds this spell and we assume quarterly frequencies. We also
adjust the weights every quarters in a decreasing fashion. We denote by τit the
replacement rate in state i and di the maximum duration of unemployment
benefits in state i. The aggregate replacement rate τt in the US is defined as:














We use min max function times 113 because it defines the fraction of the j-th
quarter in which the insured unemployed receives benefits. If di > 13(j− 1),
the fraction is simply one. This ensures that τit ∈ [0, 1] and corresponds to the
OECD methodology. η denotes the fraction of insured unemployed workers
11A change in the replacement rate can be viewed as a fall in the transition rate between
short-term (eligible to unemployment benefits) unemployed workers and long-term unem-
ployed (not eligible to unemployment benefits) because it affects the average outside option
of a worker in the wage bargaining.
12It is worth noting that the gross replacement rate has remained virtually unchanged and
is about 50%, depending on the familial situation.
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over the total unemployment workers. We take the US average rate which is
equal to 0.4 over 1998Q1-2013Q2. This account for the fraction of unemployed
workers that are not eligible for unemployment benefits. Recall that we focus
on the average replacement rate. τg = 0.5 is the gross replacement ratio at
the steady state. ωj = 0.5j with j = 1, ..., 8 denote the weighting functions.
Obviously, alternative functions can be considered but this basic function put
more weight on the first quarters, in line with the OECD methodology. Since
no maximum benefits spell exceed 104 weeks, ωj = 0.5j is well suited because
∑j ωj is close to one. Ui and Uus denote the number of insured unemployed
in state i and in the US respectively. The maximum benefits duration in the
EB and EUC08 programs is calculated using the IUR and TUR state eligibility
conditions reported in Table 2 and in Table 3 respectively. The duration and
the replacement rate are depicted in Figure 3.
Table 2: EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM (EB)
-2
The 1st 13 weeks of EB can be triggered on via a 5% 13 week IUR if the IUR is
equal to or greater than 120% of the prior 2 years’ averaged IUR over the same
13 week period OR via a 6% 13 week IUR with no lookback. The 6% IUR option
however is optional and as of now 12 states do not have this option enabled.
The TUR triggers are completely optional and while most states do have the
TUR option in effect now, many simply adjusted their law when EB was made
100% federally funded and have plans to drop it once 100% federal funding
is over at the end of CY 2013. Those triggers are 6.5% and 110% of any of the
prior 3 years (reverts to the prior 2 years at the end of CY 2013 as well) for 13
weeks of benefits and 8% and 110% of any of the prior 3 years (also reverts to
2 at end of CY 2013) for 20 weeks of benefits. The 5% IUR at 120% average of
the prior 2 years corresponding IUR’s is not optional, while all other triggers
are. As mentioned above, many states adopted the TUR trigger options when
congress made EB 100% federally funded back in 2009. If congress does not
extend that provision most of those states have plans to drop the TUR option.
Source: DOLETA





bRt = τ exp(gt)w
R
t Where gt = ρggt−1 + ε
g
t
The shock gt must adjust to match the replacement rate τdatat obtained previ-
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ously:






τ is set to be the minimum value of τdatat . Then, we assume the shock on the
replacement rate is initially equal to zero but each time positive. Assuming
that τ > min(τdatat ) does not change our main results.
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Table 3: EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 2008 (EUC08)
Start Date Program Extension of EUC08 End Date Maximum Weeks
July 2008 13 weeks for all states November 2008 13
November 2008 Tier I - 20 weeks for all stats November 2009 20 + 13
Tier II - 13 weeks for states
with TUR > 6%
November 2009 Tier I - 20 weeks for all states February 2012 20 + 14 + 13 + 6
Tier II - 14 weeks for all states
Tier III - 13 weeks if states
TUR ≥ 6%
Tier IV - 6 weeks if states TUR
≥ 8.5%
February 2012 Tier I - 20 weeks for all states September 2012 20 + 14 + 13 + 6
Tier II - 14 weeks for all states
Tier III - 13 weeks if states
TUR ≥ 6%
Tier IV - 6 weeks if states TUR
≥ 8.5% (16 weeks if no active
EB and TUR ≥ 8.5)
May 2012 Tier I - 20 weeks for all states September 2013 20 + 14 + 13 + 6
Tier II - 14 weeks if states
TUR ≥ 6%
Tier III - 13 weeks if states
TUR ≥ 7%
Tier IV - 6 weeks if states TUR
≥ 9%
September 2012 Tier I - 14 weeks for all states December 2013 14 + 14 + 9 + 10
Tier II - 14 weeks if states
TUR ≥ 6%
Tier III - 9 weeks if states TUR
≥ 7%
Tier IV - 10 weeks if states
TUR ≥ 9%
Source: DOLETA, Whittaker & Isaacs (2013)
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B Data sources
Variables Type Source Code
Unemployment rate Rate, s.a, Bureau of Labor LNS1400000016 years and over Statistics (BLS)
Vacancies rate
Rate, s.a, Job openings Bureau of Labor
JTS00000000JOL/(employment plus job Statistics (BLS)
openings). Total nonfarm
Hirings rate Rate, s.a, total nonfarm Bureau of Labor JTS00000000HIRHirings/Employment Statistics (BLS)
Nominal interest rate
Rate, Effective Federal Federal Reserve
FEDFUNDSFunds Rate, Bank of St. Louis
Monthly, Not s.a (FRED)
Gross inflation rate
Rate, GDP: Implicit Price Federal Reserve
GDPDEFDeflator, Quarterly. s.a Bank of St. Louis
Index 2005=100, Growth (FRED)
Insured Unemployment
Number Department of Labor &
CCSAWeekly Claims Report Training Administration
Quarterly, Average, s.a (Doleta)
Total Unemployed Thousands of Persons Bureau of Labor Statistics UNEMPLOYQuarterly, average, s.a (BLS)
Labor Force
Level, Civilian Federal Reserve
LNS1100000016 years and over Bank of St. Louis
Number in thousands (FRED)
Wages
Level, Total Wages Department of Labor
TOTWAGEQuarterly, not s.a Training Administration
(Doleta)
Unemployment Benefits
Government social U.S. Department of Commerce
W825RC1benefits to persons, UI Bureau of Economic Analysis
Quarterly, Sum, s.a (BEA)
Table 4: Data source and definitions.
C Alternative definition of the replacement rate
We take the total government expenditures in unemployment benefits (W825RC1)
divided by the number of insured unemployed workers. We obtain a measure
for unemployment benefits per insured unemployed worker (in$). We multi-
ply this value by the fraction of insured unemployed workers in total unem-
ployed workers. The amount is divided by the average wage per employed
woker which is equal to the total wage divided by the number of employed
workers. One gets a measure of the replacement based on government expen-
ditures (see Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Alternative measures of the replacement rate and unemployment benefits.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX (NOT IN THE PAPER)
D Unemployment benefits multiplier
D.1 Marginal multiplier
Following Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012) and Albertini et al. (2014), the
marginal multiplier corresponds to the deviation of output to its long-run
value divided by the initial increase in unemployment benefits. We denote




where y, b, yτ,t and bτ,1 are the output and the unemployment benefits long-
run values, the response of output and the unemployment benefits bt to a
shock on τt in period 1 (upon the shock) respectively. To compute the multi-
plier at the ZLB we force the economy to enter in a liquidity trap for 6 periods
using the discount factor shock βt. It involves a shock on β of σβ = 0.02. Let
yτ,β,t be the response of output following a shock on τt and βt. yβ,t and bβ,t are
the response of output and unemployment benefits to a shock on βt only. The




The size of the shock bt is set to 1%. Since the fiscal shock is temporary, output
deviates from its unconditional mean on impact and returns to its long-run
level in the absence of additional shock as time goes by. This calculation in-
volves that the multiplier is computed on a constant basis (the increase in bt)
and ensures that the UBM returns to zero in the long-run. In order to investi-
gate the whole gains (losses) from a fiscal intervention we analyze the cumu-
lative multiplier which better highlights the long-run effects.
D.2 Cumulative multiplier
Following Leeper et al. (2009) and Uhlig (2010) the cumulative multiplier cor-
responds to the net present value of output gains relative to the increase in
unemployment benefits. Output deviation from its long-run value is summed
up to that date and discounted with the steady state nominal interest rate. It





∑tj=1 R−j(bτ,j − b)
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The main difference here is that both terms are discounted using the steady
state gross nominal interest rate Rt = 1 + it. The cumulative multiplier at the
ZLB is computed in the same way except that we allow for an additional shock









λt = c−σt (32)




• Law of motion of employment:









st = 1− (1− ρx)nt−1 (36)
• Unemployment rate:
ut = 1− nt (37)

















+Etβt+1(1− ρx) (k(et+1)λt+1 + (1− ft+1et+1)ϕt+1) (41)








• Free entry condition
qtµt = κ (43)
• Output:









































λtk′(et) = ϕt ft (48)
• NKPC:
















































= ct + κvt + k(e)s (52)
• Shocks:
log βt+1 = ρβ log βt + (1− ρβ) log β + σβε
β
t+1 (53)
log τt+1 = ρτ log τt + (1− ρτ) log τ + στετt+1 (54)
(55)
E.1.2 Steady state model
• Euler equations:
λ = c−σ (56)




• Law of motion of employment:
n =
f s







s = 1− (1− ρx)n (60)
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• Unemployment rate:
u = 1− n (61)















− `nφ + β(1− ρx)(k(e)λ + (1− f e)ϕ (64)




− wR + (1− ρx)βµ (65)
• Free entry condition
qµ = κ (66)
• Output:















































bR = τwR (73)
•Market clearing:
y = c + κv + k(e)s (74)
E.1.3 Calibration




− 1 = 1.15%
In the benchmark we impose the following values: α = 1, σ = 1, φ = 1 and
τ = 0.15. We set the steady state level of employment to 0.945, ρx = 0.1061
and e = 1.
m = ρxn = 0.10





y = nα = 0.945









γ is set to balance the hiring function given m=0.10. Then γ = 2.741. We can
find c since we set κ = 0.05
c = y− κv− k(e)s = 0.93929
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Using it in the Euler equation we get:
λ = (y− κv− k(e)s)−σ = 1.06



























Given that k(e) = k0eη and η is set to 2, k0 is obtained using the free entry






In order to explicitly take into account the non-linearity induced by the ZLB
we use a projection method: Parameterized Expectation Algorithm (PEA). It
consists in approximating the policy rules and conditional expectations of the
system previously described using Chebyshev polynomials. These parametric
functions display suitable orthogonality and convergence properties to mini-
mize the error distance approximation. We consider a third-order Chebyshev
polynomial over a fixe complete grid. Our strategies is all the more accurate
that we approximate two policy functions: the ZLB and outside the ZLB. We
merge them in the algorithm to compute the expectations. Then, one can ap-
proximate kink in all decision rules accurately. We first present some numer-
ical technics that will be helpful for the understanding of the general algo-
rithm13.
F.1 Model dynamic equation
Let first summarize the model equations. The competitive equilibrium in a re-
duced form bloc can be defined as follow:
13This appendix does not intend to be a mathematical note on the algorithm but a general
description on the way the model is solved using Matlab. For this reason, many variables will
be treated as vectors or matrices, as we do in Matlab.
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Backward looking dynamics









nt = (1− ρx)nt−1 + vtqt
log βt+1 = ρβ log βt + (1− ρβ) log β + σβε
β
t+1
log τt+1 = ρτ log τt + (1− ρτ) log τ + στετt+1
Forward looking dynamics
λt = (1 + it)EtΥ1t+1 if it > 0







− wRt + (1− ρx)Et
Υ2t+1
λt


























































We define by ∆t = {it−1, nt−1, βt, τt} the vector of state variables and by :





EtΥ2t+1 = (1− ρx)βt+1λt+1
κ
qt+1









EtΥ5t+1 = (1− ρx)βt+1λt+1k(et+1)
According to those equations, there are five policy rules to determine {vt, πt, wRt , mct, et}
and five expectation functions EtΥet+1, e = 1, .., 5. The basic idea of the PEA al-
gorithm is to approximate the policy rule and the expectation function by a
parametric approximation function Φp(∆t) and Ψe(∆t) respectively, which are
functions of the state vectors.
F.2 Preliminary results on Chebyshev functions
To approximate the unknown functions: the expectations and the policy rules,
we rely on Chebyshev polynomials. The domain of Chebyshev polynomials
is the interval [-1, 1]. We will see later on how to manage an [a, b] interval.
Let D be the approximation order of the Chebyshev polynomial. With one
state variable x, the Chebyshev polynomials of order d is built according to the
following recursion:
Td+1(x) = 2x Td(x)− Td−1(x)
Given that T0(x) = 1 and T1(x) = x. Applying the trigonometric identities
Td(cos(x)) = cos(nx) where cos(nx) is an orthogonal sequence on [0, 2π], the
d-th member of the polynomial is
Td(x) = cos(d arccos(x))









b− a − 1
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a and b are the minimum and the maximum bounds of the ergodic distribution
of the variable x. Then, ϕ(x) maps x in the interval [-1,1]. φd are the parameters
that we have to determine to find the policy rules. When the number of state
variables is higher than one, we have to build a multidimensional Chebysev
polynomial. The product of polynomial terms must have an order not higher
than D. Let K be the number of state variables such that x = {x1, x2, ..., xK} The














Where 1 is a variable taking the value 1 if the product of the {d1, ..., dD}-th
member of the polynomial has a total order ∑Ks=1 ds not higher than D and
0 otherwise. For instance, in our model we assume a third order Chebyshev
polynomial with four state variables. For each control variable  the policy rule
writes:14:




2 ϕ(it−1) + φ

3 cos(2 arccos ϕ(it−1)))
+ φ






6 ϕ(nt−1) cos(2 arccos ϕ(it−1))) + ...









(1− x2)dx = 0, for all i 6= j
This property states that the Chebyshev polynomials are orthogonal on [-1,1]
with respect to the inner product defined by the weighting function:
√
(1− x2).
F.3 Grid of the state variables
When the number of state variables is higher than one, we need to construct a
multidimensional grid. We assume a complete base or “full basis”. The com-
plete basis is chosen instead of the popular Smolyak collocation method or
tensor basis. The Smolyak collocation method (see Judd (1998), Malin et al.
(2011) improves the speed of standard projection methods but it makes the
convergence more difficult in a model characterized by occasionally binding
constraints. Adaptive domain, cluster grid and anisotropic grid have found
14For the sake of clarity we normalized the subscript of coefficient θ.
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a particular attention in the numerical literature (see Judd et al. (2012) and
Judd et al. (2013)). However, according to the size of our model we do not
need to save on the curse of dimensionality in the sense that the algorithm con-
verges in less than one minutes. The complete basis provides a richer basis
than the others methods which purpose is useful for large scale DSGE model.
Under the tensor product basis, the nodes of the grid are at least equal to the
order of the Chebyshev polynomial D plus one. We simply assume that the
number of nodes is N = D + 1. Following Barthelmann et al. (2000), we
use the extrema of Chebychev polynomials as the basis for the grid points.
GN = {ζ1, ..., ζN } ⊂ [−1, 1] is the set of the extrema of the Chebychev poly-
nomials nodes. The roots of the Chebyshev polynomial of order D when the
approximation order is the same in every dimension are:





for n = 1, ...,N
For instance, a third-order Chebyshev polynomial gives
G4 = -0.9239 -0.3827 0.3827 0.9239
The grid for each variable xk at each node n is defined by:




for n = 1, ...,N ; k = 1, ..., K
where xk and xk denote the lower and the upper bound of the domain of the
state variable xk respectively. We now turn to the computation of the grid
matrix. Let Is be a vector of dimension s whose components are each equal to
one. The full tensor product basis Ht is a set of tensor product basis for each
variable k: Ht = {H1, ...,HK} ⊂ [−1, 1] where everyHk can be obtained using
the Kronecker product:
Hk = IN k−1 ⊗ ϕ(Xk)⊗ IN K−k for k = 1, ..., K
IN k−1 and IN K−k are vectors of dimension N k−1x 1 and N K−kx 1 respectively
and whose elements are each equal to one. Here Xk is the column vector of
the variable k that hasN nodes. As previously mentioned, the function ϕ(Xk)
maps each component of the vector X k in the [-1,1] domain. Ht maps each
combination of nodes. We add the time subscript for the grid because we will
compute the next period state vector that will serve as a grid to calculate next
period policy rule.
F.4 Policy rule approximations
In our model we have four control variables summarized by the vector: {vt, πt, wRt , mct, et}.
The solution of the system maps the control variables as a function of the states
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variables ∆t. In addition, due to the kink in the Taylor rule we approximate
two types of policy rules15: the unconstrained case characterized by it > 0 and
the constrained case where it ≤ 0. We define by Φg(Ht), g = un, c the policy
rule. un stands for unconstrained and c for constrained.
Φg(Ht) =
[
Φ1g(Ht) Φ2g(Ht) Φ3g(Ht) Φ4g(Ht)Φ5g(Ht)
]
g = un, c
Note that ∆t has been replaced byHt because we use the tensor grid to evalu-
ate the policy rules. The “aggregate” policy rule combines both:
Φ(Ht) = 1{it>0}Φun(Ht) + 1{it≤0}Φc(Ht)
1{it>0} is a vector which valuee are equal to 1 if the nominal interest rate is
strictly positive and 0 otherwise. We will see later on how to calculate it. Let
first rewrite some algebra to get a more compact form of the solution system.
With Ht being the tensor grid, the terms in the Chebyshev function over this
grid (The complete basis) writes :







where dk = IDk−1 ⊗Q⊗ IDK−k for k = 1, ..., K
and Q = [1, ..., D]T
As before, IDk−1 and IDK−k are vectors of dimension Dk−1x 1 and DK−kx 1
respectively and which elements are each equal to one. Q is a vector of dimen-
sion Dx 1 (T stands for the transpose) and F(Ht) maps each combinations of
state variables in the Chebyshev polynomial. Using this, one can rewrite the
policy rules in a more compact form:
Φg(Ht, ΛgP) = F(Ht)Λ
g
P
























S2 · · · φ
g
SK
 g = un, c
15This method approximate the solution more accurately than if we use a single Chebyshev
polynomial. It allows to manage the kink in the policy rules. It is important to note that the
two policy rules are linked when the expectations are computed. It means that agents take
into account the probability of moving in and out of the liquidity trap when they take their
decisions. The probability that the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB is endogenous and taking
into agents’ expectations.
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and S is the number of terms when the order approximation is D and the num-










for k = 1, ..., K
F.5 Numerical integration
An important problem is the presence of two aggregate shocks (namely βt, τt).
The expectation functions must be evaluated. For this purpose we proceed to
a numerical integration using Gauss-Hermite quadratures.
F.5.1 Gauss-Hermite quadrature
In our case, Gauss-Hermite quadrature will be particularly useful because we



















where µε and σε are the mean and the variance of the shock respectively, nh is
the number of Hermite nodes (10 in our case) and ωi are the weighting func-







where H(.) is an orthogonal Hermite polynomial and ri are the associated
roots. In the presence of multiple (ns) random variables we must compute
multiple integrals:


















ωi1 , ..., ωins G(zi1 , ..., zins )
F.5.2 Expectations in the model
As mentioned above, the goal of the PEA is to replace expectations EtΥet+1 by
a parametric approximation functions Ψ(∆t+1) such that:[






Ψ1(Ht) . . . Ψ5(Ht)
]
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These functions are assumed to have the following representation:
Ψ(Ht) = F(Ht)ΛE
where ΛE stands for the matrix coefficient of the expectations:
ΛE =

ψ11 ψ12 · · · ψ1ne
ψ21 ψ22 · · · ψ2ne
...
... . . .
...
ψS1 ψS2 · · · ψSne

S is the number of terms in the Chebyshev polynomial as previously described
and ne is the number of expectations (5 in our model). Note again that ∆t has
been replaced by Ht since we use the tensor grid to estimate ΛE. In order
to compute the expectations in the PEA procedure, one has to use the policy
rules in t+ 1. To do this, we need to calculate the next period state variables, or
equivalently Ht+1. For endogenous state variable we use their law of motion.
Given the policy rules Φ(Ht) and the initial grid of states variable {H1t ,H2t }
(being the grid of the nominal interest rate and employment respectively) the
next period endogenous state vectors are:
st = 1− (1− ρx)H2t






nt = (1− ρx)H2t + qtΦ1(Ht)











where Φ1(Ht) and Φ2(Ht) denote the policy rule of vacancies and inflation




I(nh)ns ⊗ ρβ logH
3










I(nh)ns ⊗ ρτ logH
5






2 Z2 ⊗ IN K
)
and
Zj = I(nh)j−1 ⊗ z⊗ I(nh)ns−j for j = 1, ..., ns
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IN K and I(nh)ns are vectors of dimension N
Kx 1 and (nh)nsx 1 which compo-
nents are each equal to one. nh is the number of Hermite nodes and ns is simply
the number of exogenous stochastic processes (2 in our case). The Kronecker
product of the first terms on the right-hand side I(nh)ns is needed to get a vec-
tor of all possible combinations in t + 1, given that we have nh Hermite nodes.
For instance, if Ht is a 256x 4 matrix with four state variables, Ht+1 must be
a 25600x 4 matrix if, among the four state variables, there are two shocks and
ten Hermite nodes. The complete basis F(Ht+1) with D = 3 and K = 4 must
be a 25600x 35 matrix. Given z being the nhx1 vector of the Hermites nodes in
one dimension, the multidimensional (quadratures) representation of Hermite
nodes with ns shocks (ns = 2) is given by {Z1,Z2}. It is a (nh)nsxns matrix.
The next period tensor product baseHt+1 is equal to
Ht+1 =
[




I(nh)ns ⊗ ϕ(it), I(nh)ns ⊗ ϕ(nt), ϕ(log βt+1), ϕ(log τt+1)
]
Given the next period tensor product base, we compute the next period policy
rules according to Φ(Ht+1). It should be stressed that we have to compute
the two types of policy rules and merge them according to the value of the
nominal interest rate:
Φ(Ht+1) = 1{it>0}Φun(Ht+1) + 1{it≤0}Φc(Ht+1)
Using the t + 1 policy rules it is easy to determine the values for expectation
functions Υet+1. Each variables and expectation functions in t + 1 become vec-
tors of dimensions N K(nh)nsx 1. For convenience, we reshape the vectors in
matrices of dimensions N Kx (nh)ns . For that purpose we add a second sub-
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(1− ρx)H3t+1,j λt+1,j k(et+1,j)
Me = {Me1, ...,MeN K}
where:
st+1,j = 1− (1− ρx)H2t+1,j



































TheMe matrices are obtained using a product of vectors element by element.
The product operator starts every N K element in such a way that Me has
a = 1, ..., (nh)ns columns i.e a column for each nodes of the Hermite integration.
To compute the integral one has to use the weighting functions that are solved
numerically. We denote by ω the vector of dimension nhx 1 of Hermite weights
in one dimension. With multiple aggregate shocks, we have the following
45
tensor product base for the nodes:
Wp = I(nh)p−1 ⊗ω⊗ I(nh)ns−p for p = 1, ..., ns
The numerical integration requires to make a product of weights (element by
element). We use the Hadamard product (or Schur product) (label by ◦) for
this purpose.
W =W1 ◦W2 ◦ ... ◦Wns
For convenience again, we reshape the vectors in matrices of dimensionsN Kx (nh)ns .
This will allow the combination of expectation values and weights.
Ω = IN K ⊗WT
Where T stands for the transpose. Finally the expectations are obtained by












to scale the weights since, by definition,∫ +∞
−∞ ωidi =
√
π. Now, E e is a N Kx (nh)ns matrix. Each column j corresponds
to the value of the expectation at a particular node. When summed up over j






Finally, to parameterize the expectations we can solve for the coefficient ΛE
using ordinary least square as follow:





ΛE are determined by ordinary least square. However, ΛP can not be deter-
mined in a similar way because the model is highly non-linear. Even with
a given vector of EtΥet+1 and the grid of the state variables Ht it is impossi-
ble to pin down the policy rules Φ(Ht). Then, we use a Newton algorithm.
It determines the coefficients of the policy rules that minimize the residuals
in all equilibrium equations. We defined by Run (Ht, Φun(Ht), Ψ(Ht)) and
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Run (Ht, Φc(Ht), Ψ(Ht)) the residuals of forward-looking equations in the un-
constrained and constrained case respectively. The Newton algorithm16 con-
sists in finding the coefficients ΛP that minimize the residual equations:







Step 1 Choose the order of the Chebyshev polynomial D and the number of nodes N
(which are at least equal to D + 1). Build the multidimensional Chebyshev polynomi-
als using the following recursion:
Tn(x) = cos(n arccos(x))
Step 2 Compute the grid of the 4 state variables, imposing the steady states to be
equidistant from the upper bound and the lower bound of the grid. Use the Kronecker
product to get the tensor product baseHt.
Step 3 Initialize the policy rules coefficients ΛunP and Λ
c
P and the expectations func-
tion coefficients ΛE. In our case we only set the coefficients associated to the constants
to be equal to their deterministic steady state17. The rest being equal to zero. At this
step, you should have an initial Guess for Φun(Ht), Φc(Ht) and Ψe(Ht)
Step 4: Expectations
a) Given Φun(Ht), Φc(Ht), use the Gauss-Hermite quadratures in order to compute
the next period tensor gridHt+1.
b) Compute the policy rules Φun(Ht+1), Φc(Ht+1).
c) Compute the expectations Ψe(Ht) and use the ordinary least square to pin down
the coefficients ΛE.
Step 5 Given Ψe(Ht), determine the policy rules coefficient ΛgP, g = un, c using





reaching a criteria (10−11 in our algorithm). Pin down the policy rule Φg(Ht).
Step 6 Check if the expectation functions are the same as in step 5 using an Euclidian




Otherwise, return to step 4. Repeat this procedure until convergence.
16For this step we use a vectorial Jacobian computed numerically.
17It is possible to use a log-linear or perturbation method to initialize the coefficients. But
the algorithm converges anyway.
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G Accuracy of solution algorithm
G.1 Coverage of the grid points
One source of inaccuracy arises from the coverage of the tensor grid points. If
simulated points are fairly outside the coverage implied by the tensor product
basis, the model is not solved on points that are visited in equilibrium. This
may involve potential spurious approximations. For this purpose we check if
the ergodic distributions of states variables are most of included in the tensor
product basis. By most of, we mean that it covers at least 95% (which is the case
in our simulations' 99%). We start our algorithm with a tight grid and spread
it to cover the simulated points. For the discount factor shock the minimum
and maximum value of the grid points are about 3.5 times ± σβ√
1−ρ2β
. For the
unemployment benefits shock it is set to 10 times ±στ√
1−ρ2τ
to cover the estimated
unemployment benefits shock that proxy the benefits extension.
G.2 Residuals in equilibrium equations
Den Haan & Marcet (1990), Den Haan & Marcet (1994) and Judd (1998) use a
simple and powerful algorithm to evaluate the accuracy of dynamic models.
They compute the residual of the Euler equation using Gaus-Hermite quadra-
tures over the simulated series. We perform a similar exercise and find that the
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